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THE MERCANTILE ACT: 
A STUDY IN MEXICAN LEGAL APPROACHt 
FREDERICK F. BARKER* AND JOSEPH M. CORMACK** 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Latin American republics and in most of the countries of Europe 
we find a commercial code distinct from the civil code. The first governs 
mercantile acts, the second civil acts. With the civilian, therefore, the dis-
tinction to he drawn between these t\vo classes of activities is fundamental. 
In Mexico, the severance of the law of commerce from the main body of 
private civil law is accentuated by constitutional provisions vesting in the 
central or federal authority the regulation of all commerce, in the broadest 
sense of the term. Consequently, a single federal Code of Commerce prevails 
throughout the Republic. It governs all mercantile activities, both inter- and 
intra-state. Non-mercantile acts, on the other hand, are governed by the cor-
responding state civil code, or by the Civil Code of the Federal District and 
Territories. a 
The principal matters which are controlled by provisions of the respective 
civil code, to the exclusion of the Code of Commerce, are marriage, filiation and 
the family relations in general, professional services, real estate titles, gifts and 
inheritance. The more important matters falling within the scope of the mer-
cantile code, to the substantial exclusion of the civil codes, are transportation 
by land and sea, drafts and hills of exchange, banking and bankruptcy. The 
character, as either mercantile or civil, of companies and of sales and other 
contracts not emhraced in the above enumerations is determined by the nature 
of the act in question, as evidenced chiefly by whether the object of the parties 
is, or is not, pecuniary profit, in the technical sense to he explained later. An 
t[This is the first of a series of articles on Mexican law by these authors. A second 
article, entitled "The Mexican Law of Business Organizations," will appear in the March 
issue of the REv!EW.-Ed.] 
*[Member of the Los Angeles Bar; speeializing in Mexican and international law.] 
**[Professor of Law, University of Southern California.] 
nA new civil code was promulgated Aug. 30, 1928, but did not go into effect until 
Oct. 1, 1932, some four years after promulgation. Its provisions govern civil acts in the 
Federal District and territories and are supplementary to all federal legislation. (Art. 1 of 
the new Civil Code.) 
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act may he civil in respect of one of the parties thereto and commercial in 
respect of the other. Agriculture and cattle-raising are deemed civil activities; 
whereas the mining and the petroleum industries, as a result of recent legisla· 
tion, are now viewed hy the law as mercantile. In general, not only the sub· 
stantive law governing mercantile acts differs from that governing civil acts, 
hut so also does the law of procedure, including the rules of evidence and of 
jurisdiction. 
To the common law practitioner many of the above outlined principles of 
Mexican legislation will appear anomalous and difficult of application. They 
will he treated in greater detail in the latter part of this paper. In this country, 
th~ study of any legal topic involves the examination and analysis of a vast 
array of cases and an attempt to synthesize the material so obtained. But the 
Spanish-American jurist proceeds in an entirely different manner. His first 
concern is with the historical antecedents of his subject and the commentaries 
of leading jurists, both of his own country and continent and of Europe-
principally the French, Spanish and Italian. In the light of this haekground, 
he examines the provisions of the existing and earlier codes of his own juris· 
diction and then lays down his conclusions.1 Many legal treatises published 
in Mexico are absolutely devoid of case references. Even in the courts, the 
text of the law, interpreted in the higher tribunals in the light of the doctrines 
enunciated hy national and foreign jurists, is the chief criterion of the court. 
Cases are cited sparingly, for reasons which will appear later. In this study 
we shall adopt the approach of the civilian, confining ourselves mainly, how· 
ever, to the Mexican text-writers and to the provisions of the Mexican law. 
HISTORY 
THE ROMAN LAW 
The leading Mexican commentators on the Code of Commerce devote much 
space to an examination of historical antecedents, going hack to the Roman 
law and even to earlier legal systems. They hold with M.ontesquieu: "Ilfaut 
eclairer l'ltistoire par les lois, ct les lois p·ar l'histoire" (history must he 
elucidated hy the laws, and the laws hy history).2 
The structure and underlying principles of modern civil law, as distin· 
guished from the Anglo-Saxon common law, are traceable in great measure to 
the Roman legislation, as compiled hy the Emperor Justinian in the sixth 
century. Howe, in his Studies in the Civil Law,3 finds the origin of the 
tAn interesting account of the different methods of interpretive approach which have 
prevailed in Europe during recent centuries will be found, under the chapter on philosophy 
of law, in Borchard & Stumberg, Guide to the Law and Legal Literature of France, 1931, 
published by the Library of Congress. The methods are there classified (following Dean 
Pound) as the metaphysical or a priori method, the analytical method, the historical 
method and the comparative method-reference being made, also, to a rising and still 
formative school which may be styled tbe sociological school. In recent years the Mexican 
courts and some of the jurists have shown a marked tendency toward a sociological inter· 
pretntion of the law, patterned on the ideals of the Mexican revolution of 1911 and sub· 
sequent years. 
2Quoted by Gustavus Schmidt in his Historical Introduction to tbc Civil Lnw of Sprun 
and Mexico, New Orleans, 1851. 
32d ed., Beaton, 1905, 86-93. 
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mercantile law of Rome in the Praetorian jurisdiction and particularly in the 
Jus Gentium as administered by the Praetor Peregrinus. The rules of the 
Jus Civile and of the Jus Gentium were harmonized in the later Roman juris· 
prudence and embraced in a single codified system in the Justinian Pandects. 
As a consequence of this incorporation of the general customs of merchants 
into the local Jus Civile, the Roman jurisprudence became "a law available for 
the world in general."4 
The strictly mercantile provisions of the Pandects are meager, however-
and this despite the commercial development which took place under the Roman 
Empire. Manuel Cervantes, a prominent Mexican jurist and text-writer of the 
present century, attributes this fact to the comprehensiveness and flexibility of 
the Roman civil law :5 
"Rome had a great industry and a great commerce--without doubt the 
most vast and the most active of her time; hut, in spite of this, she 
never felt the need for dividing her private law into civil and mercan-
tile ... for the very simple reason that as new juridic relations arose, 
they found a place easily in the domains of the civil law. So long as 
Rome lived, her law could evolve, could he transformed and moulded 
to the new conditions of actual life; could incorporate into itself the 
new institutions which sprang up as the result of commercial progress; 
and this vitality, this amplitude, this flexibility of the great body of the 
Roman civil law, made a secession of the mercantile law completely 
unnecessary."6 
Felipe de Ia Tena, who ranks among the foremost of the Mexican commen-
tators, adds a temperamental cause for the nieager treatment of the commercial 
law by the Roman cod.ifiers: 
''The proud rulers of the world always held in low esteem the pursuit 
of commerce, which they abandoned to their slaves and conquered 
peoples."7 
He quotes Cicero in support of this view: 
"Commerce, if in a small way, should he regarded as sordid; if in a 
large way, bringing in many things from all parts, it should, to that 
extent, not he so villified."8 
Jacinto Pallares, who flourished in the closing decades of the last century, 
was for some time director of the National School of Law of Mexico and is 
generally revered as the greatest of all Mexican jurists and commentators, takes 
the view that Rome was too militaristic to promote commerce in the spirit of 
4Howe, Studies in the Civil Law, 93, quoting Sohm. 
5Here, as throughout this paper, the excerpts from the Mexican text-writers are, with 
one exception, translated from the Spanish. An endeavor has heen made to reproduce the 
individual flavor of the author's style-le style c'est T:homme. The references are hy page 
and not by section. 
OCervantes, Sociedades Mercantlles y Civiles, Mexico City, 1915, 9-10. 
71 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, Morella. Mexico, 1922, 14. (No subsequent 
volumes have appeared.) 
81 Tena. Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 14n. 
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universal altruism and, therefore, neglected the development of the mercantile 
law: 
"Rome •.. developed no protective system of commerce, no high plans 
in favor of traffic or industry . • . ; the temper of that conquering 
people, far from understanding the benefits of commerce, knew enough 
only to inspire the promulgation of the Flaminian (or Clauclian) 
decree, which forbade patricians to engage in commerce, thereby lay-
ing the foundation for that species of infamy which weighed upon 
commerce in the customs of Rome, was voiced with approval by her 
leading orator, and is reproduced even in the latest [modern] codes, 
through the authority of tradition and the influence of the Roman 
law."9 
The closing words of the excerpt merit reflection. Pallares strikes here the 
keynote of the difference in ethnical temper bet\'/een the Latin and the Anglo. 
Saxon. We shall revert to this point presently. Further on in his historical 
sketch he continues in the same vein: 
''This [the Roman] system of the amassing of wealth by taxation is 
sufficient alone to reveal how impossible it was to awaken among the 
Romans habits of mercantile enterprise and perseverance, of peaceable 
labor and foresight, of industrial economy and discipline; •.. The 
little industry which still subsisted [under the later Roman Empire] 
was not the result of any wise laws, nor of governmental stimulus or 
protection, hut of the prodigality, dissoluteness, and inordinate luxury 
of those opulent lords of the world."10 
Whether or not we sympathize with Pallares' arraignment of Roman mili· 
tarism, there can he no doubt that her conquests opened up avenues of com-
merce, just as did the crusades in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
and, later, the Spanish invasions in Latin America and the British military ex-
peditions in other parts of the world. 
THE MIDDLE AGES 
At the fall of the Roman Empire, the commercial life of Europe was 
arrested temporarily. Aside from the frequent devastating wars and the result· 
ant poverty of the people, the feudal lords on land and the pirates on the seas 
paralyzed traffic. The times were not propitious to the development of a mer-
cantile law.11 
Upon the resurgence of commerce, in the latter part of the Middle Ages, 
new conditions demanded new laws. Cervantes graphically describes the 
situation: 
"When commerce revived and acquired momentum in the medieval 
Italian republics, in the south of France, in Catalonia, in Germany, not 
only was she without adequate laws for her regulation, hut she had to 
91 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, Mexico City, 1891, 44. (No subse· 
quent volumes have been published.) 
101 Jacinto Pall ares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 45-46. 
llCervantes, Sociedades Mercantiles y Civiles, 10. 
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do battle against existing systems of law-the Roman, the German and 
the Canonical-which frequently opposed her purposes and shackled 
her aspirations. In effect, with Rome dead, Roman law could not be 
transformed, its evolution had ceased, it stood inert, petrified in the 
works of the jurisconsults, in the sentences of the judges, in the novels 
of the emperors; and in that condition, when the generations of the 
feudal times exhumed them, they could not then be utilized by com-
merce .... The Roman law was not only mute in the presence of the 
new and varied juridic relations created by the advance of navigation 
and of commerce, but often, not to say always, its rigid and inflexible 
te}..i:S were found to be in open opposition to the nature and tendencies 
of such relations."12 
THE MEDIEVAL GUILDS 
5 
It was at this period of history that the European guilds or corporations 
made their appearance. Cervantes' picturesque description continues: 
"All men engaged in the same calling, in the same industry, in the 
same profession, grouped themselves into associations known as guilds, 
and each guild had its chief, its banner, its common treasury, its saint, 
and its own regulations. These regulations were at first merely usages, 
which rapidly became juridic customs, and in the end special laws of 
the community. The merchants also formed guilds, also joined 
together in large associations, and also aspired to have their own 
regulations and special laws, adequate to the exercise of the mercan-
tile profession. And thus in fact it came about; but by reason of their 
wealth and power, they secured something more: the right to maintain 
an exclusive jurisdiction similar to the jurisdictions of the most priv-
ileged corporations, such as the church and the army. In a word, com-
merce obtained by these means not only a law of her own, distinct 
from the Roman, the local and the ecclesiastical, but at the same time 
the privilege of recourse to special judges (called consuls), appointed 
by the guild and vested with authority to hear and decide mercantile 
suits, to the exclusion of the municipal and feudal courts."13 
Concurrently with the development of the merchant guilds, bodies of mer-
cantile law were formulated, more or less independently, in different parts of 
Europe. Among the more famous may be mentioned: the Rolls of Oleron, said 
to be the chief code of maritime law of the Middle Ages; the Consolata del 
Mare, treating almost exclusively of maritime law and claimed, by the Span-
iards, to have originated at Barcelona, and, by the French, at Marseilles; the 
ordinances of the Hanseatic League, of the north German towns; the Laws of 
Wisby on the Baltic Sea; the Statutes of the cities of Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa and 
Venice, on the Italian coast. Of these, the civilians regard the statutes of the 
Italian corporations as the most fruitful source of modern commercial law. 
Bolaffio, the Italian jurist, writes: 
''This statutory legislation [of th~ Italian guilds] governed the mer-
cantile activities of Italy from the twelfth century down to the 
12Cervantes, Sociedades Mercantiles y Civiles, 1{}-12. 
l3Cervantes, Sociedades Mercantiles y Civiles, 13. 
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beginning of the nineteenth century, and from this source are derived, . 
in a direct manner, the contents of the [mercantile] codes, in their 
essence uniform, which are operative in the different parts of the 
world."14 1 
There is much divergence of opinion among jurists in writing of the 
law merchant of the Middle Ages, but they appear to agree on several points 
of interest to us here. The statutes of the guilds marked the first appearance in 
Europe of an autonomous mercantile jurisprudence and are the original source 
of the greater portion of the modern law of commerce. They owe little directly 
to the Corpus Juris of Justinian. Their provisions, at least prior to the Italian 
Renaissance, relate almost exclusively to maritime law, were based on the cus· 
toms of merchants, without legal sanction of any constituted political authority 
and were in the main concrete, empirical and of summary administration, with 
a minimum of formal or dilatory proceedings. Their application was restricted 
to the merchants themselves and largely to members of the individual guild or 
corporation which administered them. 
CODIFICATION OF THE MERCANTILE LAW 
The first true codifications of the mercantile law, as such, are to be found 
in the two Colbert Ordinances of Louis XIV. The first, issued in 1673 and 
known as the Code Savary, treats of commerce on land; the second, issued in 
1681, of maritime commerce. These codes are the principal source of the 
Napoleonic Commercial Code of 1807, and so of modern mercantile codes. 
Since the French Revolution, the law merchant, in the Latin- and English-speak· 
ing countries at least, bas ceased to be a class legislation and now governs all 
commercial activities, largely regardless of the persons involved. From being 
subjective in character, it has become objective.15 
Outside the English-speaking nations, there are very few who do not have 
parallel mercantile and civil codes. Switzerland is one of the exceptions. Her 
federal Code of Obligations, enacted in 1911 and regarded by civilians as a 
notable achievement, draws no line of demarcation between civil and mercantile 
acts, but embraces in a single code all the forms of contract. With few excep· 
tions, too, the commercial codes of the ·World mark off the mercantile law from 
the civil objectively and not subjectively; they govern acts of commerce as 
distinguished from civil acts, and not merchants as distinguished from non· 
merchants. Germany is an outstanding exception, her present commercial code 
being subjective in its application.16 
MEXICAN MERCANTILE CODES 
The Spanish Ordinances of Bilbao, made applicable to Mexico by the royal 
decrees of 1792 and 1801, constituted the first mercantile code of that Spanish 
colony. During the first decades following Mexico's declaration of independence 
14Bolaffio, I Fatorri della Legislazione Commerciale, title 1, introduction, quoted in 
1 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 21. Tena points out that, whereas France was tho 
leader in codification of the mercantile law, she was not the first in its formation-tho 
leadership in this respect must be accorded to Italy. 1 Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 26n. 
15Condensed from 1 Jacinto Pa:llares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 249-255, and from 
1 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 25-33. 
101 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Me:rlcano, 408. 
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from Spain, a compilation known as Curia Filipica Mexicana, based on the 
Ordinances of Bilbao, largely supplied the lack of a national mercantile code. 
Mexico's first national code of commerce was promulgatedhyPresidentAntonio 
Lopez de Santa-Ana in 1854 and is known as the Lares Code, from the name of 
its drafter. It was modeled upon the French and the Spanish codes in force at 
the time. In 1855, the Lares Code was abrogated and the Ordinances of Bilbao 
were restored. In 1884, by virtue of a constitutional amendment adopted in 
1883, Mexico's second commercial code was promulgated, during the presidency 
of Manuel Gonzalez. This was replaced by the existing code of 1889, enacted 
by President Porfirio Diaz.U 
The Mexican writers lay great stress on the divergence, both in origin and 
in substance, between their mercantile and their civil law. Unquestionably the 
divergence is great. But the dissimilarities-in substance, form, terminology, 
manner of interpretation and of administration-to he found hetw·een the legal 
system of the English-speaking countries and that which prevails in the Latin 
American republics are immeasurably greater.18 Few Mexican commentators 
appreciate sufficiently, in our estimation, the debt their mercantile jurisprudence 
owes to the Justinian compilations. S. Moreno Cora, a native of Veracruz, 
Mexico, whose legal works are held in high esteem because of their conserva-
tism and lucidity of style, contends that the Justinian treatment of the civil law 
under the tri-partite division of Persons, Things and Actions (confounded by 
some later jurists with Acts) is inherent in every legal concept and never has 
been improved upon.19 It is striking evidence of the enduring influence of the 
Roman law that the first three books of the officially issued project of a new 
Mexican code of commerce20 are entitled respectively "Of Persons," "Of Mer-
cantile Things" and "Of Mercantile Acts, Obligations and Contracts." 
THE LAW MERCHANT IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
Down to the time of Coke (circa 1600) the English law merchant was in 
general that of the Continent. It was distinct from the common law, parallel 
and proceeding from a different source. It was custom, recognized and ad-
ministered in special tribunals, where the disputes of a special class were 
settled in view of peculiar duties and peculiar rights. Not until the eighteenth 
century under the judicial leadership of Lord Mansfield, did it become part of 
the general law of England.21 Because of what Jacinto Pallares terms "a pre-
17Further details regarding the history of Mexican commercial codification will be 
found in 1 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 258-263, and in 1 Tena, Derecho 
Mercantil Mexicano, 41-46. 
lSTo the reader with human insight, the extracts given in this paper from the Mexican 
text-writers and their Code of Commerce will be more illuminating than any psychoanalysis 
done after the manner of Jerome Frank in his recent outstanding work, Law and the 
Modem :Mind. To such a reader the gulf that divides the common law system from the 
civil law system will he startlingly evident. As a lawyer thinks, so is his law. 
19Cora, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, Mexico City, 1905,18-19. 
20This project was published in two volumes in 1929-1930. As yet it has not received 
legislative sanction and probably will be modified before final enactment. Some of its pro-
visions are discussed later in this paper. 
2lflowe, Studies in the Civil Law, 96. In this connection the work of Leone Levi may 
be consulted: Commercial Law, Its Principles and Administration, or the Mercantile Law 
of Great Britain Compared with the Codes of Commerce of the Modem World, and with 
the Institutes of Justinian, London, 1850-1852. 
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judice difficult to eradicate," the English have not codified the commercial law, 
although some of its principal departments, such as bills of exchange, shipping, 
companies and bankruptcy, are contained in special acts of Parliament. In 
Lower Canada, a civil code was issued in 1866. It consists of four books. The 
fourth relates to commerce but treats only of bills, notes and checks, merchant· 
shipping, carriers, insurance, bottomry and respondentia.22 This book does not 
treat of obligations in general and draws no line of demarcation between civil 
and commercial acts as such. In the United States no distinctively commercial 
code ever has been promulgated-not even in Louisiana, which has adopted in 
several other respects the legal molds of the civilian.23 
BIPARTITE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
REASON Al'ID JUSTIFICATION 
Why do the civilians have a commercial code distinct from their civil 
code? What justification is there for this practice? To some of us a discussion 
of questions such as these may seem fruitless. But both Jacinto Pallares and 
Tena devote many pages to an attempt to answer these two questions satisfac· 
torily; and since one of the aims of this study is to inspire a sympathetic under· 
standing of the methods of legal approach and interpretation of the Mexican 
jurist, we give them attentive hearing. 
Tena finds the answer to the first question in historical accidents: 
"In the light of historical data ••. we may affirm that the mercantile 
law, at least in so far as it relates to traffic on land, did not live an 
autonomous life until the second half of the middle ages, when the 
republic of Italy, at the beginning of the eleventh century, opened that 
marvelous era of commercial prosperity, of which history offers us so 
few examples. We may also affirm that this budding of a new branch 
of law was not due to demands made by the intrinsic nature of the new 
juridic relations, in any sense that these are essentially incompatible 
with the contents of the civil law, but to causes of a very different 
nature, which may be summarized as the need felt by merchants of 
casting off the cumbrous, complicated and costly formulas of the civil 
law, formulas that could not be moulded to the free and expeditious 
contractual forms needed by commerce, nor to the ready and simple 
procedure demanded by merchants for the settlement of their contro-
versies. Accordingly, if the civil law, instead of having remained 
mummified when Rome fell, had continued its development with the 
same wisdom which characterized its growth up to the early middle . 
ages; if, at the rise of the great commercial activity of the Italian 
cities, the civil law could have satisfied the new juridic-economic 
needs of the Italian republics (as happened in the case of Genoa); 
then, the statutory law of the Italian corporations would not have been 
born, because the general law would have sufficed amply to meet all 
needs. Therefore, the origin of the autonomy of the commercial law 
rests wholly on historical bases and such autonomy is explicable only 
by accidental circumstances."24 
22Howe, Studies in the Civil Law, 135. 
2SHowe, Studies in the Civil Law, 139. 
241 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 46-47. 
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In answer to the second question, as to any inherent justification for this 
cleavage of the commercial law from the main body of the civil law, Tena 
quotes extensively from a polemic carried on between the eminent Italian mer-
cantile jurists Vivante and Vidari.25 The briefest summary of the arguments 
advanced must suffice us here. Vivante maintains that the law of obligations 
should he a single unit, with no distinction drawn between civil and commercial 
acts; Vidari contends, on the other hand, that the system of dual codification 
should he preserved. 
Vivante takes the view that the distinctive autonomy of the commercial law 
is today an anachronism, since everyone performs some acts of commerce; that 
England, the United States and Switzerland illustrate the practical possibility 
of governing all contractual obligations by a single general doctrine of con-
tracts; that it never has been possible to draw a precise line of demarcation 
between civil and commercial acts, either by written law, by doctrine or by 
court decisions; that in consequence this duality of codification makes for legal 
uncertainty; and that, finally, a partition of the private law into civil and mer-
cantile exercises a pernicious influence upon its scientific development. 
Vidari, Vivante's opponent in this controversy, claims that commercial 
relations call for a special legislative discipline; that commercial law should 
apply only to acts of the mercantile profession, the nature of which demands 
such "discipline"; that the increasing commercialization of life's activities, 
which has been in progress for many centuries, constitutes no warrant for a 
fusion of the civil and commercial codes; that, while it is true that the pro-
visions of the civil code of Italy and of other countries do not meet fully the 
requirements cf modern commerce, this is not conclnsive on the point at issue, 
because there always will he need of applying different legal principles to 
different forms of human activity, as for instance, in regard to civil associations 
and mercantile companies; that the success of the Swiss General Code of Obliga-
tions is due to peculiar national conditions, and particularly to the geographical 
position of Switzerland; that all the other European countries have both 
a civil and a mercantile code; and, finally, that a duality of codification has 
made for a higher development of both the civil and the commercial law. 
As Tena points out, the provisions of the Mexican political constitution 
(which place all "commerce" under federal control and leave the regulation 
of matters purely civil to the several States) are an insuperable bar to the 
amalgamation of the mercantile and the non-mercantile law into a single 
code.26 
Jacinto Pallares, while agreeing in the main with Tena, takes a more in· 
structive and comprehensive view of the situation: 
"Why have such acts [mercantile acts] demanded a special legisla-
tion? The explanation of this phenomenon is very simple [sic]. At 
the outset it is noteworthy that, with the exception of regulations in 
regard to certain matters, no special codes of commerce exist in 
countries governed by customary law [Pallares here refers to our com-
mon law], because in such countries, undoubtedly, the same elastic 
251 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 47-54. 
261 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 54. 
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movement of constant adaptation which moulded the customary law, 
"'rith its tendencies and routines, to the fresh needs of civil business, 
extended likewise its effects to mercantile business; but in countries 
governed by written law two currents of doctrine, of judicial interpre-
tation, and of legislation were formed: the one, follo"'ring in the path 
of the Roman law, created codes or bodies of doctrine inspired by that 
law, as if in an oracle, and even violating custom in order to make it 
prevail; while the other, in its paroxysms and expansions of freedom, 
introduced the mercantile activities, which could not live cramped in 
the formulas of the Roman law. The first of these currents, as Scherer 
says, resting upon the Roman law, which concerned itself little or not 
at all with commerce, instead of producing a constant renovation of 
the law paralleling the unfoldment of human ideas and activities, he· 
came petrified, as did all civil laws drawn from the Pandects [sic]. 
The second current, that of commerce, slowly became emancipated 
from the cumbrous formulas and judicial systems of the Roman law, 
which were merely so many obstacles to the facile and speedy transac-
tions demanded by traffic and by the multiple and novel operations of 
commerce."27 
Among the examples of new fields of law created by the demands of com· 
merce, Pallares lists bills of exchange, companies, paper currency and securities, 
insurance, mercantile agency and contractual molds freed from the formulas 
and solenmities of the Roman law. He points out, also, that commerce demands 
la"'vs that are comprehensive and cosmopolitan, whereas the purely civil law 
reflects the peculiar genius and customs of a nation, with its innate prejudices 
and traditions.28 In a footnote, Pallares attributes the persistence of separate 
codes of commerce mainly to human inertia. and distaste for innovation, quoting 
(with approval) Aguanono. This Italian jurist laments the profound contrasts 
which exist between the precepts of the civil and those of the mercantile code of 
his country and characterizes as irrational any dual codification of private law.20 
THE MERCANTILE TE!IIPER 
In one of the excerpts given above, Jacinto Pallares speaks of "that species 
of infamy which weighed upon commerce in the customs of Rome," and finds 
that this prejudice against trade is reproduced even in the modern codes. In the 
last analysis, it is this racial unwillinguess to accept commerce as the staff of 
life that best accounts for the bipartite codification of private law prevailing in 
the non-English-speaking countries. 
In England, as in Europe generally, the feudal spirit was hostile to mer· 
cantilism. The Norman-French landed aristocracy, once the foundation, but 
long since only a relic, of feudalism, as a class always has disdained engage-
ment in trade. British commerce was developed by the large Anglo-Saxon urban 
middle classes, who stood outside the feudal system and whose instinct for trade 
is indisputable. Had it been otherwise, the later development of English com· 
mercia! law would have displayed more of the Latin genius. 
211 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 744-745. 
281 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 745-746. 
2 91 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 746n. 
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In the United States, settled dominantly by Anglo-Saxon and not by Latin 
races, and later freed from the traditions of British royalty and feudal nobility, 
the people easily effaced all stigma from commerce and substituted for· the 
hier~chy of birth and station a hierarchy based upon material wealth. Con-
currently their commercial laws were broadened and liberalized. 
In Mexico, and generally in the other Latin American republics, the Teu-
tonic strains are negligible; there is no native bourgeois class; commerce is in 
the hands of foreigners. Under such conditions, a whole-souled national ac-
ceptance of mercantilism is impossible. As might he expected, we find in these 
republics a dispositional detachment from commerce and a strongly entrenched 
isolation of the mercantile law from the main body of the private law. 
A MERCANTILE CODE FOR THE UNITED STATES 
It is not likely, for several reasons, that any of the English-speaking nations 
ever will adopt a distinctively commercial code. In the first place, our pref-
erence for a case jurisprudence is too deeply ingrained. Unlike the Latins, we 
approach our legal problems concretely and pragmatically. Despite our ethical 
idealism, we are utilitarians in our legal practices, with more concern for facts 
than for schematic systems of equity. The Englishman, and even more so the 
North American, lacks that fondness for philosophical unity which is so char-
acteristic of the Central and South American. Our legal reasoning is inductive, 
rather than deductive. We determine cases by reference to other cases, rather 
than by recourse to abstract principles of jurisprudence. With us, legal precepts 
are little more than convenient pegs on which to hang cases80 and not, as with 
the civilians, expressions of authoritative doctrine. Our methods pf mental ap-
proach do not lend themselves readily to legal codification. 
Furthermore, commercialism, the commercial spirit, has engulfed us in the 
United States. In a sense, we are all merchants, selling our goods or our 
services. We are lacking in that dispassionate detachment with which a Latin 
is able to view commerce--as merely one of many equally necessary human 
activities. Material gain is our popular yardstick of success. We do not attain 
to the broader perspective of life enjoyed by the Latin. It is not easy for us 
nowadays even to conceive of a system of mercantile law segregated from the 
main body of private law. 
Lastly, in the United States the legal situation created by the constitutional 
provisions which place in the federal power the regulation of interstate and 
foreign commerce and leave to the several States the general control of only 
intrastate commerce, has placed technical difficulties in the way of the adoption 
by any State of a distinctively mercantile code. 
STARE DECISIS IN THE MEXICAN PRACTICE 
A Mexican federal law provides, in substance, that interpretations of law 
of the Supreme Court of the nation shall he authoritative for the other federal 
courts and for the state courts, if upheld by an unbroken line of five decisions 
of the Supreme Court itself. Even when a legal rule is so established, the 
SO"Hardly a rule of law of today hut may he matched by its opposite of yesterday • 
• • • These changes or most of them have been wrought by judges." Judge Cardozo, quoted 
in Frank, Law and the Modem Mind; 328. 
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Supreme Court is free to set it aside in any later decision and not infrequently 
has done so.31 Neither the civil codes nor the Code of Commerce make any 
mention of case precedents, hut prescribe, in effect, that where the written law 
is silent, the court shall decide the controversy "in accordance with general 
legal principles."32 
General legal principles play an important part in the Mexican practice. 
They are for the Mexican lawyer what cases are for us-an illumination of the 
written law. The chief sources of these principles are the French, Spanish and 
Italian text-writers. In Mexico, however, acceptance of a general principle 
always has been a gradual process, a consensus growing out of an interplay of 
views, where the opinions of leaders of the Bar carry as much weight as those 
of the bench. 
The point of special interest here' is that neither during the formative pe· 
riod of a general principle, nor after its general acceptance, are the related 
Mexican cases cited. One may read through a score of Supreme Court decisions 
without finding therein a single citation of a case. The same is true of briefs 
and opinions prepared by eminent jurists. In the Mexican textbooks referred to 
in this paper, there is hut one citation of a Mexican case pertinent to our in-
quiry, and that is on a question of negligible importance. 
T. Esquivel Obregon, a leading Mexican jurist, speaking of Latin Ameri-
can countries generally, writes: 
"This [the rule that judicial decisions are not binding except with 
respect to the cases in which they are actually rendered] by no means 
implies that the decisions of the courts have no authority whatever, 
hut that they have none as a source of positive law. A settled 'practice' 
has very considerable authority as a doctrine supplying the deficiencies 
of legislation, whose rules, because of the general way in which they 
are framed, require adaptation to the varied conditions of the concrete 
facts of life, provided such adaptation or interpretation does not prove 
erroneous in the light of legal science. Hence for a Latin-American 
lawyer the codes and scientific works which comment thereon or which 
study the principles of law, are of more interest and authority than 
mere judicial records."88 
The well-nigh total absence of case citations in the Mexican practice is not 
adequately accounted for by the paucity of national case reports or the lack of 
cumulative digests; hut is characteristic of the national legal approach already 
referred to-a predilection for the general and the abstract, a distaste for the 
particular and the concrete. 
Eduardo Pallares, writing in 1921, recognizes the true reason for the rarity 
of case citations in his practice, hut thinks he observes a tendenoy in the courts 
to pay more attention to them than was their custom formerly. This Pallares, 
son of the illustrious Jacinto, is also a close student of the law and a jurist of 
national repute, most of whose works have been written since 1917. Among 
Sl.Ley de Amparo, Arts. 147-150. 
azNew Federal Civil Code, Art. 19; Code of Commerce (1889), Art. 1324. Art. 20 of 
the old Civil Code of 1884 was to the same effect. 
asT. Esquivel Obregon, Latin-American Commercial Law, New York, 1921, 7. This 
work is written in the English language. 
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them are two volumes of brief legal monographs, consisting mostly of critical 
case reports.34 The excerpt given below is from his work entitled "Juris· 
prudence of the Supreme Court of Justice": 
" ... Nowadays it may he more important in a suit to rely upon a 
decision of the courts than upon a quotation from some renowned text· 
writer. Our law, like the English, is being transformed into a law of 
precedents, that is, of legal cases and final judgments. What has pre-
viously been decided by a judge or by a court serves as a certain and 
necessary basis for the decision of the same point or of a similar point. 
As a consequence, in the United States and in England, the collections 
of legal cases, of final judgments and decisions of the authorities, have 
a colossal importance. In such collections resides the true law, the law 
which the people have lived and have put into practice, and not the 
law which is only written in the codes. Something similar is occurring 
among ourselves. Influenced by ·the current of Americanism which 
circulates in the national life, and which is despoiling us slowly, hut 
fatefully, of our Latin mode of being, of the tendency to theorize, to 
live on literature, to wish to determine everything in accordance with 
abstract principles, to engulf ourselves in Byzantine discussions and 
to retard business by useless documentation-we are learning to he 
practical; and nothing can he more expeditious than to base our law 
upon final judgments or upon rulings of the administrative author-
ities."35 
As an outspoken and independent thinker and acute observer of national 
traits and tendencies, Eduardo Pallares carries on the work of his distinguished 
father. But his prophetic statement that the Mexican law "is being transformed 
into a law of precedents" has not, in the opinion of active practitioners quali-
fied to judge, been justified by the events of the decade elapsed since he made 
the prediction. Mexico has become Americanized in recent years, it is true; hut 
only in the mechanical sense. Her national and legal cultures show little sign 
of Americanization. 
SCIENTIFIC DEFINITIONS OF THE :MERCANTILE ACT 
Since the code provisions which define acts of commerce are "largely 
empirical, arbitrary, and even self-contradictory"36 and contain, furthermore, 
an omnibus clause, both Jacinto Pallares and Tena are at great pains to evolve 
what in civilian parlance is termed a scientific definition of mercantile acts, in 
the light of which, supplemented by researches in history and comparative law, 
they interpret the code enumeration of acts of commerce. The master, Jacinto 
Pallares, is emphatic on the importance of scientific definitions in Mexican 
jurisprudence: 
''That a scientific definition is contradicted by positive texts of the 
law can never serve as an argument for declaring the definition un-
scientific, and much less for eliminating it from the rank of a funda-
34Eduardo Pallares, Jurisprudencia Mexicana. Two volumes. Mexico City, 1926-1927. 
SSEduardo Pallares, Jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Mexico City, 
1921, preface. 
361 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 56. 
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mental principle of interpretation; on the contrary, the law or· legal 
texts which contradict such a definition should he deemed legal excep-
tions, created by the lawgiver for special reasons and of strict inter-
pretation. . . . " 81 
This jurist holds that "the intention to re-sell in order to make a profit" is the 
distinguishing characteristic of commerce. He finds the essence of mercantile 
acts "in acquisition for a valuable consideration with the purpose of profiting 
by the [subsequent] alienation or use of the thing acquired."88 His scientific 
definition of an act of commerce is as follows: 
"A mercantile act is any civil89 juridic act by means of which goods or 
values are acquired for a valuable consideration with the exclusive oh· 
ject or intention of transmitting [ re-conveying] the use or ownership 
in order to make a profit by the transaction, as also the act in which 
the said proposed profit is realized."~0 
In Tena's opinion, the two essential elements necessary to eonstitute an act 
of commerce are intermediation and speculation.41 His scientific definition is: 
"An act of commerce is any contract through which a person acquires, 
for a valuable consideration, a property of whatsoever character with 
the intention of making a profit by its transmission [re-conveyance], 
as likewise the contract, if for a valuable consideration, by virtue of 
which the said transmission is effected."42 
Manuel de la Torre, a Mexican jurist of some note, finds that the "domi-
nant characteristic of mercantile acts is mediation with the intent of profit." 
Writing in 190043 he points out that agriculture and the extractive industries 
(mineral and petroleum extraction, for example) "have always been placed by 
all legal systems outside the mercantile law," because, although they may in-
volve speculation, a desire to make a profit, there is no mediation-no buying 
from one party to sell to another. As will he seen later, since Manuel de la 
Torre penned the above, the Mexican legislators have shifted the mining and 
petroleum activities into the category of acts of commerce. 
A Spanish commentator defines commerce as "traffic in the products of 
nature and of industry with the object of obtaining a profit."41 Traffic is here 
employed in its broader sense of trade in general. 
371 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1005. 
ss1 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 995. 
39The use of the word "civil" in this definition is confusing and is criticized in 1 Tena, 
Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 55n. 
401 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1003. 
411 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 59. 
~21 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 62. 
~sAn essay entitled "Actos Mercantiles," appearing, with other monographs by Mexi-
can jurists, in a memorial collection styled Comentarios Breves sohre la Legislacion Patrin, 
Mexico City, 1900. 
HCited by Antonio de J. Lorenzo in 1 Annotated C6digo de Comercio de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico City, 1899-1901, 13. 
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The act of an intermediary cum animo lucri is the characteristic mercan· 
tile act, in the opinion of most civilian writers; but the French jurist Thaller is 
the leader of a school which regards the intermediation (circulation) as the 
only element essential to constitute commerce. 45 
T. Esquivel Obregon gives a definition of commerce which calls attention 
to its collectivistic element, a feature in recent years increasingly emphasized 
by Latin American legislators, including the Mexican: 
"We may now define commerce as the social function of mediation be-
tween producer and consumer, which, e:x.ercised habitually and with a 
view to speculation, serves to promote or increase the circulation of 
wealth."46 
It should be observed, before leaving this subject, that no writer claims 
that his scientific definition of acts of commerce embraces all the acts enumerated 
as such in the code of his country. As already stated in another connection, the 
Italian jurist Vivante declares categorically that neither· the law, nor doctrine, 
nor court decisions have been able, thus far, to draw a precise line of demarca-
tion between civil and commercial acts. 47 The same writer finds it impossible 
to reduce the enumeration of acts of commerce of the Italian code to "a single 
concept"; and Lyon-Caen and Renault, speaking of the French code, reach the 
conclusion that it is futile to attempt to find "one single formula" which will 
embrace all acts of commerce.48 
THE PROBLEM UNDER THE CODES 
MERCANTILE ACTS UNDER EARLIER MEXICAN CODES 
The first national Code of Commerce of Mexico, promulgated in 1854, 
provides that "the law regards as mercantile business": 
(1) The purchase and exchange of fruits for immediate profit; 
(2) All bills of e:x.change and commercial drafts and vouchers, if drawn 
to order.; and 
(3) Any business arising directly out of trade or directly related thereto, 
such as: transportation by land or sea, insurance, agency, indemnity 
bonds and pledges. 
The text of the law is somewhat condensed in the foregoing enumeration.49 
It will be noted that this Code excludes from commerce agriculture, the ex· 
tractive industries (mining and the like) and manufacturing. The Code ex· 
pressly provides that any person, even though not a merchant, who performs an 
act of commerce is subject to the mercantile law in respect to such act.50 
45Cited in 1 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 60. 
46T. Esquivel Obregon, Latin-American Commercial Law, 34 (italics added). 
47Quoted in 1 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 49. 
4SQuoted in 1 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 56. 
'gArt. 218. 
DOArt. 6. 
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Special tribunals of commerce, then operating in many cities of the Republic, 
are accorded by this Code exclusive jurisdiction in mercantile matters and rules 
of procedure for such tribunals are laid down.r.1 This Code was abrogated in 
the year following its promulgation and the authority of the old Spanish Ordi-
nances of Bilbao restored. The latter compilation had no direct effect upon the 
subsequent course of development of the distinction under examination. 
No new national code of commerce was enacted until the year 1884•. The 
Code of 1884 opens with an interesting definition of commerce: 
"Commerce is the collection of acts whose exclusive object is profit, 
by means of the purchase, sale or exchange of the products of nature, 
industry, or art; of their insurance or transportation, or of other con-
ventions [related thereto], authorized by law or permitted by usage."G2 
The Code defines as "mercantile acts" those which constitute an act of 
commerce (see the definition of "commerce," above) and then proceeds to 
enumerate various classes. These classes are substantially the same as those 
contained in the present Code of 1889, although the phrasing and the order of 
enumeration are different.53 In general, the desire to make a profit, plus inter-
mediation, is the controlling element in the determination of what constitutes 
an act of commerce under this Code, the character of the parties as merchant or 
non-merchant being immaterial. 5~ Suits arising under this Code were tried in 
the common courts and not in special commercial tribunals. 
SCOPE OF THE PRESENT CODE 
The Code of Commerce now in force was issued September 15, 1889, to 
become effective January, 1 of the following year. It was promulgated by Presi-
dent Porfirio Diaz, by virtue of a general authorization of Congress granted 
June 4, 1887, under constitutional amendments adopted December 14, 1883, 
and May 29, 1884.55 The provisions of the Code were not discussed in Congress 
at the time of its passage and, strange as it may ~em, the minutes of the draft-
ing commission never have been made public.50 It appears from internal evi-
dence that the greater portion of the articles was transcribed, often literally, 
from the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885; but Article 76, which enumerates 
the acts of commerce, follows closely the provisions of Article 3 of the Italian 
Code, which in turn are based upon those of Article 632 of the French Code. G7 
Consequently, the Spanish, French and Italian commentators frequently are 
appealed to by the Mexican writers on mercantile law. 
Below is a condensed table of contents of the Code of Commerce now in 
force. As will he seen, this table displays not only the order of arrangement of 
the matter, but the topics embraced and the relative space given to each: 
51Arts. 925-1091. 
52Art, 1. 
58Art. 13, 
54Arts. 3 & 15. 
551 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicmo, 731-732. 
50See introduction to Lozano, C6digo de Comercio de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. 
571 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 45, and footnote on 404. 
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Topic 
Scope of Code Application ...................................... . 
Concerning Merchants and Brokers ••••.•••••.••••••..•••...•.••.•. 
Acts of Commerce .•..•....•.•••...•••.•.•.•...••.••••.••.•.••..• 
Land Commerce: 
Article 
1-2 
3-74 
75-76 
Mercantile Contracts in General............................... 77-38 
Mercantile Companies......................................... 89-272 
Mercantile Commission (Agency).............................. 273-331 
Mercantile Deposit • . • . . .. . . • • .. . • . .. .. • . • • .. .. • .. . .. . • • .. • • • 332-357 
Mercantile Loan. . .. • .. . .. .. • .. • • • .. • • . . . • • . . .. . • • . .. . • . • • . . . 358-370 
Mercantile Sales............................................. 371-391 
Insurance .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. • .. .. . . .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . 392-448 
Bills and Notes.............................................. 449-575 
Transportation . . . • . • . . . • . . . • . • . • • . . . • . . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . 576-604 
Mercantile Pledge............................................ 605-615 
Bearer Securities . . .. . . . . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. . 616-634 
Money and Institutions of Credit............................. 635-640 
Maritime Commerce.............................................. 641-944 
Bankruptcy . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . • • . . • . . . . . . . • . • . 945-1037 
Prescription • .. . . . . .. . • .. .. . • .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . • . .. . 1038-1048 
Mercantile Suits.. . . . . . . . . • . • . . . • . . . . • . . . • • . . . • . . . • • . . • . . . . . • . . . . 1049-1500 
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Banks, railroads, warehouses and some other commercial institutions are 
regulated by special legislation, thus accounting for the limited space accorded 
to their regulation by the Code. The relatively large space devoted to maritime 
commerce is an inheritance traceable to the maritime development of the coun-
tries upon whose codes the Mexican Code is based. The Mexican commentators 
have written very little on this department of the law. 
It will be noted from the foregoing tabulation that, while the topics of the 
rights and obligations of merchants regarded as a class, of mercantile com· 
panies, insurance, bills and notes, maritime commerce, bankruptcy and com-
mercial suits, all receive full treatment, the important matter of mercantile sales 
and other common forms of mercantile contract on land is covered but scantily, 
occupying approximately only one-third of the whole. A partial explanation of 
this is to be found in Article 2 of the Code, which prescribes that "in the 
absence of provisions of this code, those of the common [civil] law shall 
apply." However, one of the chief sources of difficulty in interpreting the rules 
of the Code of Commerce is this supplemental authority of the Civil Code of 
the Federal District, which now supplants the state Civil Codes in their former 
supplemental authority in this connection. 57" The interpretive interrelation he· 
tween the civil law and the mercantile law is stated by Jacinto Pallares in the 
following terms: 
"The first is the genus, the second the species; the first regulates all 
the civil acts of human life, the second the mercantile civil acts; the 
first lays down the fundamental and primitive precepts, the second 
the secondary precepts for certain acts. In consequence, the Mer-
cantile Code must be applied to mercantile acts, and has preference 
over the civil law; but in the absence of precepts of the Mercantile 
Code, those precepts of the Civil Code subsist by reason of their 
absolute and general character. Accordingly, articles 1, 2, 5, 81 and 
87•New Federal Civil Code, Art. 1. 
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1051 of our Code provide that its precepts are applicable solely to acts 
of commerce, and that only in the absence of precepts of the said 
Code, shall those of the common [civil] law be applicable."G8 
Tena dissents from the views expressed above by Jacinto Pallares, princi-
pally on the ground that, with the rapid expansion of commerce in recent 
times, the coinmercial law has become of broader scope than the civil law and 
therefore should not be regarded as of exceptional application.G9 
Jorge Vera Estafiol, for several years professor of mercantile law at the 
National School of Jurisprudence, author of several legal works and for the 
past quarter of a century a leader at the Mexican Bar, has summarized the 
relation of the mercantile to the civil law in the following terms: 
"Two situations may arise: the one where the precepts of the civil law 
contradict the system developed in the mercantile law; and the other 
where one must have recourse to the civil law, and the precepts there 
found do not contradict the mercantile law. In the first situation the 
civil law, to the extent that it contradicts the mercantile law, is not 
applicable. In the second situation, the civil law is applicable."60 
ARTICLES 75 AND 76 
The Code of Commerce contains no definition, in the logical sense, of 
mercantile acts. Article 75 contains an enumeration of such acts, with an 
appended omnibus clause; and Article 76 declares certain acts to be non· 
mercantile. 
The purist in terminology will be irked by finding "enterprises," "book· 
stores," "checks" and "obligations" all listed in the Code as "acts." The codes 
of most of the Latin countries are guilty of this lingui11tic impropriety. It is 
avoided, however, in the German and Austrian codes, as also in the officially 
published project of a new Mexican code of commerce already referred to. We 
should point out, perhaps, that the term "speculation," as used in the Mexican 
law and text books, denotes economic gain and does not carry our connotation 
of great risk. The term "enterprise" as employed in the Code has a technical 
meaning, which will be discussed presently. The articles under examination, 
closely translated, read as follows: · 
"Art. 75. The law regards as acts of commerce: 
"I. All acquisitions, alienations and rentals, effected with the 
object of commercial speculation, of supplies, articles, movables or 
merchandise, whether in a natural state or after being worked or 
wrought; 
"II. Purchases and sales of immovables, when effected with the 
said object of commercial speculation; 
"III. Purchases and sales of interests and shares in, and of 
obligations of, mercantile companies; 
581 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mcxicano, 754. 
G91 Tena, Derccho Mercantil Mexicano, 68-72. 
60From an unpublished course of lectures on the Mexican Mercantile Lnw, delivered 
at Mexico City in 1908. (Italics added.) 
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"IV. Contracts relative to obligations of the State or other 
documents of credit current in commerce; 
"V. Enterprises of provisions and supplies; 
"VI. Enterprises of construction, and public and private works; 
"VII. Enterprises of fabrication and manufacture; 
"VIII. Enterprises of transportation of persons or things, by land 
or by water; 
"IX. Book stores and editorial and typographical enterprises; 
"X. Enterprises of commissions, of agencies, of commercial 
business offices, and establishments of sales at public auction; 
"XI. Enterprises of public spectacles; 
"XII. Operations of mercantile commission; 
"XIII. Operations of mediation in mercantile business; 
"XIV. Operations of banks; 
"XV. All contracts relative to maritime 'commerce, and to interior 
and exterior navigation; 
"XVI. Contracts of insurance of every kind, provided that they 
are entered into by enterprises; 
"XVII. Deposits by reason of commerce; 
"XVIII. Deposits in general warehouses and all operations made 
upon certificates of deposit, and pledge bonds issued by general 
warehouses; 
"XIX. Checks, bills of exchange or remittances of money from 
one place to another, among all classes of persons; 
"XX. Vouchers or other documents to order or to bearer, and 
obligations of merchants, unless it be proved that they originated 
from a non-commercial transaction; 
"XXI. Obligations between merchants and bankers, if not of a 
nature essentially eivil; 
"XXII. Contracts and obligations of the employees of merchants 
concerning the business of the merchant in whose employ they are; 
"XXIII. The alienation that an owner or a husbandman makes 
of the products of his land or of his husbandry; 
"XXIV. Any other acts of a nature analogous to those stated in 
this Code. 
"In case of doubt the commercial nature of the act shall be deter-
mined by the judgment of the court." 
"Art. 76. Purchases made by a merchant of articles or merchan· 
dise for his own use or consumption, or for that of his family, are not 
acts of commeree; nor are resales made by workmen, when such 
resales are a natural consequence of the practice of their calling." 
19 
As already stated, commentators are agreed that the provisions of Articles 
75 and 76 are unscientific in arrangement, arbitrary in character, lacking in 
explicitness and even self-contradictory.61 For the purpose of obtaining a 
611 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 56, 57 & 74; Cora, Derecho Mercantil Mexi· 
cano, 31; 1 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 978-991, passim. 
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general grasp of this heterogeneous list of acts of commerce, the re-classification 
by Cora will be found helpful: 
"The acts of commerce enumerated by our Code, in Article 75, 
may be classified in the following mauner: 
"First. There are acts which are mercantile by reason of the 
intent of the party who performs them. 
"Second. There are other acts which are mercantile by reason of 
their nature, regardless of the intent of the parties who performed 
them. 
"Third. Lastly, there are still other acts which the law calls 
'enterprises' ['empresas'], in which the repetition of acts of the same 
nature is assumed."62 
Under the first heading, fall the acts covered by Sections I and II of 
Article 75; 63 under the second, fall the acts enumerated under Sections III, IV, 
XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI and XXII. These call 
for no special comment here because the act, being mercantile in its nature, is 
bilaterally commercial; and consequently the mercantile law will govern both 
contracting parties, regardless of intent.6' Under the third heading fall the 
"enterprises." 
"In these acts it can not be doubted that the law, in addition to the idea 
of profit which such acts presuppose, has taken into account the repeti· 
tion of acts of a like nature, without which it is inconceivable that there 
could be any enterprise."65 
Such acts, considered as mercantile acts, may be unilaterally commercial-that 
is, mercantile as to one of the parties and civil as to the other. We shall revert 
to this point later. 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE PROVISIONS 
Both Tena and Jacinto Pallares freely admit that, of the twenty-four 
sections contained in Article 75, only the first section accords with the scientific 
definitions they give of acts of commerce.66 In their interpretations of the 
provisions of this and related articles, neither they nor Cora cite any case 
precedents, but appeal to the opinions of foreign commentators on analogous 
provisions in their own codes, to legal doctrine, to principles of equity and to 
juristic and logical consistency. Unfortunately, they often differ among them· 
selves on points of great practical importance. The following discussion of this 
intricate subject makes no claim to exhaustiveness, but will serve chiefly to 
throw additional light on the methods of interpretation employed by the 
Mexican jurists. 
62Cora, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 32. 
escora, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 32. 
6'Cora, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 33. 
BGCora, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 33. 
661 Tena, Derecho Mereantil Mexicano, 87; 1 Jacinto Paliares, Derecho Mercantil 
Mexicano, 1004. 
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The civilian's use of the term "enterprise" ( empresa} calls for elucidation. 
Tena writes: 
''Three elements are essential to constitute an enterprise, according to 
legal doctrine: the organization of the productive factors (nature, 
capital and labor) ; the distribution of the product to satisfy the needs 
of consumers; and the risk which the head of the enterprise assumes 
in the elaboration and sale of the product. Whenever any person, 
whether an individual or a company, coordinates the factors of the 
production, utilizing workmen in tasks in which they are apt, availing 
himself of the forces of nature, and furnishing the necessary capital 
(machinery, raw materials, etc.,) provided that this coordination of 
factors has for its object the satisfaction of a demand by consumers, 
the head of the enterprise running the technical and economic risks 
of his industry, there arises an organism called an 'enterprise.' " 67 
Not all enterprises are mercantile, however, but only those listed in Article 
76 and such others as are analogous to those listed.68 
WHEN AN ACT IS BOTH CML AND MERCANTILE 
Article 1050 of the Code of Commerce provides that where an act is mer-
cantile in regard to one of the parties and civil in regard to the other, the 
procedure applicable in case of litigation is the mercantile where the defendant 
has performed a mercantile act and the civil where he has performed a civil act. 
The procedure is made to depend upon the character of the act from the stand-
point of the defendant.69 
Such acts are termed "mixed" by Jacinto Pallares. He points out that not 
only does the determination of the proper law of procedure applicable to the 
case turn upon the character of the act in relation to the defendant, hut so, 
likewise, does the determination of the proper substantive law governing his 
right and obligations. In a word, if the act he mercantile in respect of the 
defendant, the mercantile law, both substantive and adjective, is necessarily 
applied; and if it he civil, the civil law. Jacinto Pallares deduces this rule 
from a collation of Articles 4, 75, 76 and 1050 of the Code of Commerce, 
interpreted in the light of "tradition and historical antecedents."70 In the 
opinion of the same jurist, the general principle outlined above does not extend, 
however, to the rules of evidence governing the trial of such mixed cases. On 
this point he evolves the following rule: Only the evidence permitted by the 
civil law may be set up against the party whose act was civil; whereas against 
the party whose act was mercantile, evidence permitted by either the mercantile 
or the civil law may be introduced. He grounds this conclusion on principles 
of equity enunciated by a French text-writer.71 
671 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 112. 
681 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 113. 
69This article is borrowed from the Belgian Code of 1876. 
701 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1027-1029. 
111 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1030. 
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THE RULE OF PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY 
Do the opening words of Article 75---"The law regards as acts of com· 
merce"-raise an absolute and irrebuttable presumption as to the mercantile 
character of the acts enunciated? Tena holds that the presumption is absolute, 
except in regard to acts falling under Sections XX and XXI, where the law 
itself prescribes that evidence of the civil nature of the act may be offered.12 
Cora, on the other hand, appears to hold that the presumption of mercantility 
is in general rebuttable by evidence of the civility of the act in question.13 
One of the doctrinial principles applied by the commentators to determine 
whether a given act is or is not mercantile is that of principal and accessory. 
For instance, the owner of a vineyard who purchases barrels for the storing of 
his wine does not perform an act of commerce, even though the purchase be 
made with the intent to sell the wine in the barrels, because the sale of the latter 
is merely accessory to the sale of the wine, a product of agriculture-which is not 
a commercial activity.u 
By a similar process of reasoning, the purchase, by the owner of a spring 
of mineral waters, of bottles to be used in the sale of such water, is a civil act, 
because the principal act, the sale of mineral water by the owner of the spring, 
is civil, for reasons which will be indicated later when treating of the extractive 
industries.75 The same is true of the purchase by a custom tailor of thread, 
buttons and lining to be used in the making of a suit for his customer. Such 
purchases are accessory to the tailoring, which, in itself, is not a mercantile 
activity.76 The same principle explains why the sale by an artisan of the 
product of his labor is not an act of commerce. Such a sale is deemed by the 
law accessory to the exercise of a calling not itself commercial.71 
The authorities do not agree, however, upon the scope of application of 
this principle in the present connection. Tena contends that an act otherwise 
purely civil may become mercantile if performed by a merchant in connection 
with his business, giving as an example the renting of a warehouse for the storage 
of merchandise. In his opinion, such an act, although in its nature civil, 
becomes mercantile because accessory to a commercial act, namely, the sale of 
goods for profit.78 Cora reaches the same conclusion.19 But Jacinto Pallares 
is unqualifiedly contra, holding that leases of immovables never are mercantile 
acts.80 
ISOLATED ACTS 
The authorities differ also as to whether an isolated purchase-for instance 
by a non-merchant, cum animo lucri-is an act of commerce. Tena contends 
that such an isolated act is civil: 
721 Tena, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 84. 
7BCora, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 35. 
741 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 1015. 
75} Tena, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 93. 
76} Tena, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 93. 
T7Cora, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 35; Code of Commerce, Art. 76. 
78} Tena, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 79. 
79Cora, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicsno, 32, 34. 
801 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercsntil Mexicano, IOOG-1081. 
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"An isolated act of mediation between producer and consumer, 
although inspired by an intent to make a profit ••• can not he termed 
a mercantile act, nor does it fall vnthin the sphere of application of 
the Code of Commerce."81 
23 
He gives as an example the purchase of a ring by a non-merchant from a 
merchant, the purchase being made with full intent to resell at a profit.82 
Jacinto Pallares, on the other hand, strongly maintains the opposite view, giving 
as an illustration the purchase of a horse by a lawyer, not for his personal use, 
hut "'lv:ith intent to resell at a profit. In t;he opinion of this jurist both the 
purchase and the resale are acts of commerce.88 
AGRICULTURAL PURSUITS 
Agriculture always has been regarded as an antithesis of commerce. In 
the Italian, the Napoleonic, the Spanish and other commercial codes, even sales 
made by the landowner or the farmer of the produce of the land are expressly 
excluded from the legal realm of commerce.84 Legal doctrine supports this 
conclusion, principally on the ground that there is no mediation or interposition 
of a third party, the husbandman obtaining the produce directly from the soil 
and not from another party. His gains are the product of his labor, aided by 
nature. But for some reason which the commentators are at a loss to explain 
satisfactorily, Section XXIII of Article 75 lists, among acts of commerce, !!ales 
made by the landowner or the hmihandman of the produce of the land. Tena 
hazards the opinion that the drafters of this provision desired to commercialize 
agriculture, inspired by a wish to favor its development.85 The same author 
points out that an organized agricultural venture might, in a given case, he 
characterized by a court as a mercantile enterprise, in which event substantially 
all its activities would he mercantile.86 His conjecture, made in 1922, is 
remarkably prophetic, since the project of Mexico's new Code of Commerce 
expressly includes the activities of an agricultural enterprise among acts of 
commerce. 
0"'1v:ing to nationalistic and socialistic legislation enacted since the adoption 
of the new federal Constitution of 1917, the question of the mercantility or the 
civility of agricultural activities has become one of considerable practical 
interest to foreigners and to capitalists. As the law is commonly interpreted at 
present, engagement in agriculture itself, on whatsoever scale, is a civil pursuit. 
In regard to sales of the produce in its natural state by the landowner or the 
lessee, the provisions of Section XXIII of Article 75, referred to above, are 
generally interpreted in the light of Article 4 of the Code, to the effect that such 
sales are mercantile acts only when made in a store or warehouse established in 
some town for that purpose.87 
sq Tena, Derecho Mercantil Me:ricano, 63. 
821 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Me:ricano, 64. 
831 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1018. 
841 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 161. 
851 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 162. 
S61•Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 164. 
1171 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 1035-1039. 
24 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
THE MINING AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES 
Certain branches of industry are conveniently termed "extractive." By 
our economists, agriculture is included, with mining, oil extraction, cutting of 
lumher, fishing, hunting, quarrying and the like, among the extractive industries. 
The civilians, however, following the French economists, do not include agri· 
culture among such industries.88 The reason for this appears to be that farm 
produce is a joint product of nature and man working in co-operation, whereas 
minerals, oil, timber, fish, game, rock and the like are "extracted" by man alone 
in their natural state. In the first case man and nature work simultaneously; 
in the second, successively. 
Mining, agriculture and cattle-raising (to which must be added the petro· 
leum industry since 1901) for several centuries have constituted the major part 
of Mexico's business activities; but up to recent years none of the extractive 
industries were classified as acts of commerce in the Mexican law. The reason 
given for this by the doctrinaires was that the products of the extractive industries, 
in the same manner as agricultural produce, were acquired directly from nature 
and not through an intermediary.89 As will be seen in a moment, later legisla· 
tion has ignored this doctrine. 
Prior to the enactment of the Mining Law of 1892 all mining operations, 
as well as mining companies, were purely civil. Artiele 24 of this law, how· 
ever, provided that mining companies formed after the passage of the Law 
should be governed by the precepts of the Code of Commerce; and Article 79 
of the same law declared to be mercantile acts all contracts of sale or of 
exploitation of mines, as likewise all contracts relative to the minerals. Article 
79 of the Mining Law of 1909 and Article 98 of the Mining Law of 1930 are to 
the same effect.90 
In regard to petroleum, up to 1910 the exploitation of oil deposits was a 
civil activity.91 Between 1910 and 1925, the legal status of the petroleum 
industry was in a phase of transition and uncertainty; 02 but Article 19 of the 
Petroleum Law of 1925 states categoricaii,- that all acts of the petroleum 
industry are to be deemed mercantile. It is noteworthy that this same article 
provides, in substance, that where both the Petroleum Law and the Code of 
Commerce are silent, the rules of the Civil Code of the Federal District, and not 
of the state civil codes, shall govern. Article 394 of ·the General Banking Law 
of 1926 is to the same effect. As was pointed out above, the new federal Civil 
Code is now supplemental to all federal legislation, including, therefore, the 
Code of Commerce. 
881 Tena, Derecho Mercantil Mexicano, 161, footnote. 
891 Jacinto Pallares, Derecho Mercantil Me:rlcano, 1039. 
ooFor other provisions of this law, consult: Barker, Mexican Mining Concessions, 
(1931) 5 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, I. 
91Mining Law of 1909, Art. 2. 
92For a scholarly historical sketch of Mexico's subsoil juridic evolution, see: Edward 
Schuster, Laws and Jurisprudence of Mexico Concerning Petroleum, (March 6, 1928, No. 5) 
~oceedings of American Foreign Law Association, New York City. 
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THE I929 PROJECT OF A NEW CODE OF COMMERCE 
For several years past, the enactment of a new Code of Commerce has been 
under consideration by the federal administration. The present Code does not 
accord with many of the revolutionary principles embodied in the Constitution 
of I917. In 1929-I930, the federal government published a project for a new 
Code of Commerce, which, with some modifications, is likely to become law 
before very long. It is carefully drafted and is much superior technically to 
the existing Code. As will be seen, in its treatment of acts of commerce and 
of the relation of the mercantile law to the civil law, it simplifies greatly the 
existing law and lays to rest many disputed questions of cardinal importance. 
The new commercial code, as at present projected, governs the status of 
all merchants and is applicable to all mercantile things and acts.93 Where an 
act is mercantile in respect to any one of the parties thereto, it is subject to the 
mercantile law in respect of all parties. The so-called "mixed act" is, there-
fore, abolished.94 The juridic relations arising out of the representation of a 
merchant by his employee are governed by the commercial law; but the contract 
of employment is governed by the federal Code of Labor, which will be dis-
cussed later.95 
The hierarchy established among the sources of commercial law is as 
follows: 
(I) Mercantile legislation; 
(2) Commercial usages as recognized by the proper chamber of commerce; 
(3) The provisions of the Civil Code of the Federal District and Terri-
tories, to the exclusion of the state civil codes; and 
(4) General principles of law.96 
The high rank accorded to commercial usages is noteworthy. The pro-
visions of the Civil Code of the Federal District are not applicable where they 
are repugnant to the nature of the related system established by the commercial 
law or by commercial usages.97 
Acts of commerce are classified as follows: 
(I) All acts relative to mercantile things, which latter are listed as: sea-
going vessels, airplanes, patents, trademarks and the like, government con-
cessions, currency except where it is the object of a civil transaction, bills, 
notes and the like, the assets, considered as an entity, of a commercial or 
industrial concern ( fundv mercantil). the rights and obligations of shareholders 
in a mercantile company, and the services of the mercantile professions and 
of bankers; 
(2) Acts of acquisition of movables effected by one party with the intent 
to re-convey them to another, as likewise such re-conveyances; 
93Art. 1. 
9~Art. 2. 
95Art. 3. 
96 Arts. 4 & 5. 
97Art. 6. 
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(3) Acts of organization, functioning and liquidation of enterprises of the 
following nature: real estate, manufacturing, construction, the extractive and 
agricultural industries, transportation, insurance, deposits, editing, publicity, 
"spectacles" and all forms of public service. An enterprise is defined as an 
organization of the economic factors needed to produce goods or furnish services 
for trade; 
( 4) The external operations of such enterprises; 
(5) Acts by virtue of which a person obtains or furnishes money or other 
movable property, to be used in the execution of any of the foregoing acts; 
(6) Acts auxiliary to, or connected with, those enumerated, including acts 
executed to guarantee their performance; and 
(7) Any other acts comprised in the Code.98 
The reader will have noted several important modifications of the existing 
law in this enumeration, among them the inclusion of all acts relative to things 
which are commonly the subject matter of commerce, the abolition of the 
animus lucri as one of the tests of the mercantility of an act, the adoption of the 
economio definition of an enterprise as one of the decisive criteria of mercantility 
and the express inclusion of the agricultural and public service enterprises as 
commercial concerns. "The acts of merchants are presumed to be mercantile, 
unless the contrary is proved."99 
UNCERTAINTY OF THE MEXICAN LAW 
The uncertainties of the Mexican law give less concern to the national than 
they do to the foreigner.100 As Eduardo Pallares points out, "commerce 
develops outside the law and against its express precepts." This author was 
cited in our discussion of the rule of stare decisis in the Mexican practice. He 
is of the moderu school of thought and has no patience with excessive legisla· 
tion, nor with the classical spirit in legal interpretation: 
"We all know that laws are issued to form therewith horribly volumi-
nous collections, whose simple perusal parches and brutalizes the 
brain of the patient reader, leaving him incapable of comprehending 
any perspectives than those born of an arid acquaintance with legal 
texts. One of the greatest errors of juridic classicism is indeed rooted 
in excessive legislation, in the multiplication without end of legal 
texts which no one knows (except tlvo or three famous jurists) and 
which supposedly govern the world. Who is so credulous as to believe 
that the wearisome compilation of Justinian really governed the 
9BArts. 298, 299, 610 & 611. The language of the project has been somewhat con· 
densed in the above enumeration. 
99Art. 612. 
lOOJerome Frank's Law and the Modem Mind is of interest in this connection. The 
popular belief, said by this writer to exist, in certainty of the law is dubbed by him "Tho 
Basic Legal Myth." (Chap .. 1, passim.) This invaluable study of our American legal mind 
will he read with peculiar delectation by the civilian jurist. In Mexico, and in Latin 
America generally, no such myth exists. Eduardo Pallares, who is quoted at length above, 
would probably agree with Frank in one of his conclusions: "Much of the uncertainty 
of law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value." (Page 7 of Frank's 
work.) 
THE MERCANTILE ACT IN MEXICO 
Roman world? Who actually entertains the belief that the compila-
tion of Duhlan and Lozano101 (just for example) is the juridic guide 
that has ruled the destinies 'of Mexico? The fact is that laws in the 
greatest abundance are promulgated, hut very few of them are ob-
served, and fewer still are known to the majority of the people of the 
country. Ninety per cent. of all legal precepts forever remain dead 
letters, either because there is no occasion to apply them or because 
they are openly disobeyed. • • • When the classical spirit of the law 
disappears, giving place to a spirit more simple, more human, more 
efficient, less metaphysical-then the laws will not he so copious nor 
so prolix in useless articles. Excessive reglementation will vanish. The 
eternal disputes of pettifoggers on legal texts, veritable juridic atoms, 
will have no reason for existence, and the legislator will abandon for 
all time his sorry mission of producing voluminous codes which en-
tangle the simplest things and weary both the mind and the will. In 
the meanwhile life develops outside the law; and more particularly 
commerce tends to realize its autonomy and creates usages contrary to 
the Mercantile Code.''1°2 
27 
The writer then gives numerous examples of accepted practices in commerce 
which ignore the code provisions. 
This jurist has been quoted at some length, not only because he gives the 
chief reason why the uncertainties of the Mexican law-outside those of the 
Stamp and other revenue laws--do not greatly trouble the local merchant, but 
because he typifies a new school of juridic approach common among Mexican 
lawyers of the rising generation. This approach is at once effect and cause of 
a breaking down of the time-honored principles of individualistic justice. 
Mexico is moving rapidly in a new economic phase, where pro-Mexican and 
pro-labor ideals are paramount.103 · 
THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW 
The federal Labor Law of August, 1931, in force throughout the Repuh-
lic,l04 has given birth to a new kind of act, not to he classified as either civil or 
mercantile, hut strictly sui generis. The purpose of the Labor Law is to socialize 
labor by means of collective labor contracts and the non-judicial settlement of 
disputes. It governs all employment, both manual and intellectual, arising out 
of any agreement of personal service, excepting only government employees.105 
The provisions of the law are markedly collectivistic in tendency and embrace 
every aspect of modern labor problems. Where its precepts favor the work-
1°1The noted jurists referred to were compilers of the Mexican laws issued from the 
date of Mexico's Declaration of Independence down to 1904. 
1°2Eduardo Pallares, Derecho Commercial Mexicano, Mexico City, 1922 (a pamphlet}, 
5-7. The work is unfinished. 
103A practitioner today who would give useful counsel on concrete questions involving 
Mexican law must gauge primarily: (a} the consensus of opinion, or its absence, among 
jurists on the correct interPretation of the pertinent written law; (b) the status and trend 
of the economic and juridic policies of the federal executive administration. The relative 
weight to be given to these two criteria will vary with the nature of the legal problems 
involved. As in every jurisdiction, the personal elements in Mexican legal realism are also 
of prime importance, but these can not be discussed here. 
104Art. 1. 
105Arts. 2 & 3. 
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man, they are non-waivable.'-06 The distinctive character of this legislation and 
its detachment from both the Civil and the Mercantile Codes are evidenced by 
the terms of Article 16: 
"Article 16. Cases not provided for in the present Law, or its regu-
lations, shall be determined in accordance ·with custom or usage, and 
where these are lacking, by principles derived from this Law, by 
principles of the civil law where not repugnant to this Law, and by 
equity." 
The law is administered by a hierarchy of special boards, composed of repre-
sentatives of the employers, the employees and the government.107 In general, 
the law is patterned upon the French labor legislation of the present century. 
REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 
We have seen that commerce, as an institution, has bad to fight for legal 
recognition. Under· Roman militarism it occupied an ancillary place and was 
held in mild contempt; under feudalism, as it prevailed in Europe during the 
middle ages, land tenures formed the basio structure of the law, the usages of 
merchants standing outside the 'feudal system; up to within reeent times 
Christian doctrine and ecclesiasticism were hostile to the commercial spirit. 
Only with the advent of the industrial age, which may be said to have opened 
with the Italian Renaissance, did the legal practices of the merchant receive the 
serious attention of jurists. 
As might be expected, the early struggles for survival of commerce gave 
rise to an autonomous system of mercantile law. It was the law of merchants, 
formed and administered by and for themselves alone. With the breaking 
down of class distinctions and privileges which culminated in the Freneh 
Revolution, the autonomy of the mercantile law also was broken. In France, 
and generally in the European countries, it became then a component part of 
the national law. 
In England, a complete blending of the rules of the Law Merchant with 
common law principles has been accomplished. But in the countries of Europe 
which were dominated by the French arms or by the Gallic culture108 and in 
their colonies in America, the amalgamation of the mercantile with the civil law 
never has been perfected. The ancient autonomy of the Law Merchant sur-
vives, although in an attenuated form, in the bipartite codification of the 
private law-a civil code parallel~d by a commercial code. 
Historical accidents, political cataclysms, alone will not account for dif-
ferences in legal systems. The genius of the people is always an important, if 
not the dominant, factor. English pragmatism never has ceased to be adverse 
to any codification based on philosophical unity. England's comparative iso· 
106Art, 15. 
1.01Arts. 334-685. 
lOS"The conquered nations kept the French laws as a benefit-a remarkable tbing." 
Bluntschli, quoted in Lobinger, Modern Expansion of the Roman Law, (1932) 6 Univ. 
Cincinnati L.Rev., 154, 176n. 
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lation in legal development may be traced to either geographical or tempera-
mental insularity-essentially a single conditioning cause. Her instinct for 
commerce explains largely her readier acceptance of commercial usages as 
part of the general law of the land. 
In the United States, conflicting ethnical and political forces have brought 
about a compromise between the code and the case system; but, as in England, 
our relatively early engulfment by commercialism was an insuperable bar to 
any juridic divorce of the mercantile from the main body of the civil law·; 
instead, we tend to commercialize all law. 
The industrial spirit of Germany, developing in a milieu of class mili-
tarism, has broken away from the Gallic system which pivots on the mercan-
tility of the act and has reverted to the older system based on the mercantility 
of the party who performed it-a form of class legislation. No doubt, also, the 
German's keen sense of philosophical values pointed the way. 
In Switzerland, mere geographical position and a desire to encourage 
foreign investments are not sufficient to account for her adoption of a unified 
code, freed from the elusive distinction between civil and mercantile acts. That 
love of a fine adjustment and delicate co-ordination of parts, characteristic of 
the watchmaker, mus~ also have played its part in the production of the Swiss 
unified Code of Obligations. 
The Mexican civilization, Latin in origin and in developmen~ in spite of her 
geographical abutment on the United States, never has become imbued with the 
commercial spirit. The people are artists rather than merchants. During the 
three decades covered by the regime of President Porfirio Diaz/09 the heydey 
of capitalism in Mexico, the commercial development was foreign, not native. 
The Cientificos, who fostered this development, were Mexican statesmen, not 
foreign capitalists. They controlled "big business" and never were in any sense 
its servants. Mexico, as a nation, never has been indigenously capitalistic or 
plutocratic. The Diaz regime exploded in revolution chiefly because it con-
stituted a superimposed digression from the nation's natural growth, an excur-
sion due largely to British and American influences. Since 1911, the national 
movement in Mexico has been in the direction of some form of socialism, halted 
often by military revolutions, hut none the less certain and well defined when 
traced through two decades.no The long-delayed passage re~ntly of the federal 
1091878-1883 and 1888-1911. 
110Legislation enacted by several of the States of the Mexican Union during the 
current year, particularly Veracruz, Queretaro and Hidalgo, threatened, for a time, a much 
broader application of socialistic principles than is warranted by the provisions of the 
national constitution of 1917. This legislation provided for the possibility of a summary 
and more or less general expropriation of lands and industries on the ground of social 
welfare or puhlic utility, with nugatory provisions for compensation of the expropriated 
owners. The movement was fomented by active communist leaders, most of them foreigners. 
The federal authorities, for some time past, have shown themselves to be strongly adverse to 
such propaganda. Several hundred communists have been deported or sent to penal colonies 
during the past few years. The highest federal executive authorities have declared this 
recent state socialistic legislation to be contrary to the best interests of the country at this 
time as well as unconstitutional. Those who now control the destinies of the nation appear 
to h~ve resolved to maintain the status qlW of the revolutionary ideals as incorporated in 
the constitution and related laws--not to recede, but likewise not to attempt further essays 
iu the same field. The principle of private ownership of property is to be maintained, 
suhject only to such limitations in the collective interest as are sanctioned by the constitution. 
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Labor Law, outlined above, is Mexico's most significant political event 
since 1917. 
We have seen that Mexico, although not temperamentally a commercial 
nation, has broadened progressively the sphere of application of her Com-
mercial Code. The activities of one industry after another have been catalogued 
by the legislator as mercantile acts. This has been due partly to the growth 
everywhere of the commercial spirit and partly to indigenous factors. Since 
1911 the slogan that Mexico is for the Mexicans has been pqpularized. This 
has made for the nationalization and federalization of industries, of which one 
outstanding example is the petroleum industry. Another is agriculture. The 
national agrarian movement is regnlated almost exclusively by federal law; 
and the activities of private agricultural enterprises involving large investments 
in all likelihood shortly will be declared acts of commeree and so fall under 
federal jurisdiction. The same is true of the public service enterprises. 
Many nationals of Mexico believe that the domestication of all industry 
will promote its development. Be this as it may, the merchant and the capitalist 
in general will thereby become more amenable to federal discipline and inter-
vention; the imposition and collection of taxes will be facilitated; and the 
national ideals of socialism and social solidarity will be instituted more 
easily.m. The most striking illustration of this process of socialization through 
national enactments is the recent issuance of the federal Labor Law. 
111A review of the socialistic features of Mexico's political constitution of 1917 and 
related laws will he found in a former article by one of the present writers: Barker, New 
Laws and Nationalism in Mexico, (1927) 5 Foreign Affairs, 589. 
